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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of deferred tax assets on firm creditworthiness.  
Specifically, I investigate whether the proportion of a firm’s total assets that are 
composed of deferred tax assets is associated with Standard & Poor’s credit ratings.  The 
benefits associated with deferred tax assets are primarily realized through deductions 
from future taxable income.  If declines in financial performance lead to a subsequent 
default, deferred tax assets may provide no value to creditors seeking recovery of their 
investment.  I document a significant negative association between deferred tax assets 
and credit ratings.  The evidence is consistent with credit market participants 
incorporating the risk associated with deferred tax assets into their assessment of credit 
risk and suggests that deferred tax assets may adversely affect the quality of a firm’s 
balance sheet.  Additionally, I find that the magnitude of the association is strongest for a 
subsample of firms rated just above or below investment grade (i.e. BBB-/BB+) where 
credit risk is particularly sensitive. 
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Section I:  INTRODUCTION 
This study extends recent research analyzing the effects of book-tax differences 
on a firm’s credit risk (Crabtree and Maher 2009; Ayers et al. 2010; Edwards 2011; 
Gallemore 2011) and investigates a fundamental question that has not been addressed in 
prior studies:  Is the proportion of total assets comprised of deferred tax assets associated 
with a firm’s credit risk? 1  The process of accounting for book-tax differences, as 
prescribed by SFAS 109, creates deferred tax assets and liabilities on the balance sheet.  
Prior research in this area finds evidence that book-tax differences convey information 
regarding the quality of earnings reported on the income statement as well as signals of 
future profitability.  By focusing specifically on deferred tax assets, this study attempts to 
provide insight into the impact of book-tax differences on the quality of a firm’s balance 
sheet.2 I predict that increases in deferred tax assets are associated with higher levels of 
credit risk.  Creditors are particularly concerned with the downside risk of a firm.  If 
declines in financial performance lead to a subsequent default, the benefits of deferred tax 
assets, which are primarily realized through deductions from future taxable income, may 
provide no value to creditors seeking recovery of their investment.   
In order to test the relation between deferred tax assets and credit risk, I use an 
ordered logit model to determine whether firms with higher levels of deferred tax assets 
are associated with lower credit ratings. The model includes controls for size, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The balance sheet reports the estimated net realizable value of deferred tax assets. The independent 
2 This study does not examine the impact of deferred tax liabilities.  Credit market participants tend to be 
conservative in their interpretation of financial information (Pettit et al. 2004).  I expect credit analysts to 
be more concerned with the overstatement of assets than the overstatement of liabilities.  In untabulated 
analyses I partition the sample based on whether a firm’s net deferred tax position is a deferred tax asset or 
a deferred tax liability.  I find that inferences remain unchanged regardless of a firm’s net deferred tax 
position.   
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profitability, leverage, firm risk, accruals quality, the ability to repay debt, and book-tax 
differences.   
 Investigating the impact of deferred tax assets on credit ratings is important for 
several reasons.  First, deferred tax positions are substantial for many firms.  Poterba et 
al. (2011) document that more than 40 percent of their sample firms reported a net 
deferred tax position that exceeded 5 percent of total assets and nearly 10 percent of 
sample firms reported a net deferred tax position in excess of 10 percent of total assets.   
Second, the role of credit rating agencies as gatekeepers to the capital markets has 
become increasingly important.  “The provision of credit, particularly in the U.S., has 
shifted away from commercial banks to the rated capital markets in recent years” (Pettit 
et al. 2004).  Credit ratings play an essential role in contracting because they are viewed 
as efficient benchmarks of creditworthiness (Frost 2007).  Both credit rating upgrades 
and downgrades are associated with significant stock market reactions (Jorion et al. 
2005).  Finally, in a survey of chief financial officers, “a good credit rating” was listed as 
one of the most important factors influencing capital structure decisions (Graham and 
Harvey 2001).   
I document a significant negative association between deferred tax assets and 
credit ratings.3  The evidence is consistent with credit market participants incorporating 
the risk associated with deferred tax assets into their assessment of credit risk. The model 
estimates that moving from the first to the third quartile of deferred tax assets decreases 
the probability of a credit rating upgrade by 15.6 percent (from 9.2 percent to 7.8 
percent), and increases the probability of a rating downgrade by 18.0 percent (from 9.7 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To estimate an ordered logit model with credit ratings as the dependent variable, I convert the Standard & 
Poor’s letter ratings to a numeric scale ranging from 1 to 22 where D=1 and AAA=22 
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percent to 11.4 percent). In additional analysis, I examine a subsample of 429 firm-years 
with a credit rating that sits on the threshold between investment grade and speculative 
grade.  For these firms, moving from the first to the third quartile of deferred tax assets 
decreases the probability of a credit rating upgrade by 19.4 percent (from 9.1 percent to 
7.4 percent), and increases the probability of a rating downgrade by 24.7 percent (from 
5.8 percent to 7.2 percent).   
This study contributes to prior literature in several ways.  I add to existing 
research in accounting for income taxes by examining whether the proportion of total 
assets comprised of deferred tax assets is associated with credit risk.  The results suggest 
that deferred tax assets may adversely impact the quality of a firm’s balance sheet when 
evaluated from the perspective of a creditor.  Academics have called for research that 
examines the use of tax information in the financial statements by credit market 
participants (Graham et al. 2012; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  In 2012, U.S. corporate 
debt issuances exceeded $1.325 trillion compared to U.S. equity proceeds totaling $244.5 
billion (Thomson Financial 2012).  Despite the relative weight of the debt capital 
markets, the majority of research in accounting for income taxes continues to focus on 
equity investors.  Holthausen and Watts (2001) suggest that equity investors and lenders 
are not likely to utilize financial statement information in the same manner. 
This paper extends prior literature examining the impact of book-tax differences 
on credit risk.  Several recent studies find evidence consistent with large book-tax 
differences signaling lower earnings quality, which results in a decline in 
creditworthiness (Crabtree and Maher 2009; Ayers et al. 2010).  However, Wilson (2010) 
and Guenther (2011) urge caution in interpreting the findings of these studies and state 
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that additional research is needed to clarify their results.  Instead of focusing on the 
signals that book-tax differences convey regarding earnings persistence and future 
profitability, this study attempts to fill a gap in the literature by examining the balance 
sheet implications of deferred tax assets and their impact on firm creditworthiness.4  In 
assessing the potential for recovery in the event of insolvency, credit analysts must assess 
the quality of the assets available to satisfy the claims of creditors.  Deferred tax assets 
represent future tax deductions.  If firms facing conditions of economic stress are unable 
to generate taxable income, then the benefits of deferred tax assets cannot be realized and 
are therefore of little value to creditors.  Finally, this study contributes to the broad 
literature of researchers modeling the credit rating process by documenting a potentially 
significant determinant of credit ratings and providing additional evidence of how 
accounting information is used in the rating process.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents 
background information, reviews the related literature, and develops the study’s 
hypothesis.  Section III describes the research design.  I discuss the sample selection 
process in Section IV.  Section V presents the results and findings, and I conclude with a 
summary and discussion in Section VI.   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ayers et al. (2010) find a negative association between large positive changes in book-tax differences and 
credit ratings changes.  They find a similar relation with large negative changes in book-tax differences.  
The authors suggest that large positive changes in book-tax differences may signal decreased earnings 
quality or off-balance-sheet financing.   
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Section II:  BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION, AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
Credit ratings 
In order to examine the impact of deferred tax assets on the creditworthiness of 
firms, I use credit ratings as a proxy for credit risk.  Credit ratings and rating agencies 
serve a gatekeeping role in the capital markets and have a significant impact on firms’ 
access to, and cost of, capital (Pettit et al. 2004).  Credit ratings are opinions about credit 
risk.  They reflect the rating agency’s assessment of the ability of an issuer to meet its 
financial obligations, the relative likelihood of default, and the likelihood of recovery in 
the event of default.  The major rating categories used by Standard & Poor’s are AAA, 
AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, and D where AAA, the highest rating, represents 
“extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments” and D represents default 
(Standard & Poor’s 2013).  Standard & Poor’s will modify ratings from AA to CCC with 
the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign in order to designate relative standing within a 
major rating category.  Credit market participants generally consider ratings of BBB- or 
higher to be investment grade while ratings of BB+ or lower are considered to be 
speculative grade. 
Accounting for income taxes 
Firms report two different measures of profitability.  Pre-tax book income is 
reported to financial statement users, such as investors and creditors, and is calculated 
based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  Taxable income is the 
basis for determining corporate tax liabilities.  Taxable income is reported to taxing 
authorities and is calculated according to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  While both 
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profitability measures utilize accrual accounting, the differing objectives of GAAP and 
the IRC lead to differential treatment of certain transactions.  These book-tax differences 
can be either permanent or temporary in nature.  Permanent book-tax differences describe 
revenues and expenses that are included in one measure of income, but are completely 
excluded from the other.  Permanent differences cause effective tax rates to differ from 
statutory rates.  While researchers have made strides in estimating permanent differences, 
they are difficult to measure (Hanlon 2005).   
Temporary differences refer to revenues and expenses that are included in both 
book income and taxable income, but in different time periods.  The consequence of these 
timing differences is that the tax bases of assets or liabilities are not equal to their 
reported amounts in the financial statements.  However, by definition, temporary 
differences should reverse in subsequent time periods.  SFAS No. 109 prescribes a 
balance sheet approach to accounting for income taxes.  Firms must recognize deferred 
tax assets and liabilities for all temporary differences.  If the reversal of a temporary 
difference is associated with future taxable amounts, then firms will recognize a deferred 
tax liability.  Alternatively, a deferred tax asset is recognized when the reversal of a 
temporary difference will produce future deductible amounts.   
Prior literature 
The pricing of tax information by equity market participants has been an active 
area of research (Graham et al. 2012).  Early research on the valuation impact of deferred 
tax positions was motivated by the passage of SFAS 109.5  Amir and Sougiannis (1999) 
find that deferred tax assets from tax loss carryforwards are valued positively as assets.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 SFAS 109 is effective for firm-years beginning after December 15, 1992.  SFAS 109 is now classified as 
ASC 740 under FASB’s new codification system.   
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However, they find two conflicting effects that influence the valuation of investors.  
There is a measurement effect stemming from the fact that deferred tax assets represent 
future tax savings.  There is also an information effect because the presence of a loss 
carryforward from prior years serves as a signal regarding the probability of future losses. 
Amir et al. (1997) examine the separate components of deferred tax assets and 
document significant variation in their valuation coefficients.  For example, they find that 
deferred tax assets related to restructuring charges, have larger valuation coefficients than 
deferred tax assets related to employee benefits.  In contrast, the valuation coefficient is 
close to zero for deferred tax liabilities related to depreciation, which indicates investors 
do not believe they are true liabilities.  The authors conclude that the results provide 
evidence consistent with investors valuing deferred taxes based on a function of when the 
deferred tax accounts reverse. These findings illustrate the complexity associated with 
valuing deferred tax assets.  However, subsequent research has identified serious 
weaknesses in the models employed by the valuation relevance literature (Holthausen and 
Watts 2001).  Therefore, the inferences drawn from these studies may be unreliable.  
Consequently, a review of the literature by Graham et al. (2012) conclude that it remains 
an open question as to whether or not the deferred tax accounts are priced by equity 
market participants. 
 The idea that the valuation impact of a deferred tax position is dependent upon 
when the deferred tax account will reverse has also been advocated in financial statement 
analysis textbooks.  A theoretical model developed by Guenther and Sansing (2000) 
challenges this assertion.  Their model of firm value demonstrates that the timing of 
expected deferred tax reversals should not affect the value of the firm.  Instead, they 
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show that the valuation of deferred tax assets and liabilities depends on whether they 
originate from a transaction that is included in GAAP income before or after its inclusion 
in taxable income.    
 Laux (2013) tests the theoretical predictions of Guenther and Sansing (2000) by 
examining whether deferred tax assets and liabilities provide incremental information 
about future tax payments.  His primary finding suggests that there is an asymmetrical 
association between deferred taxes and future tax payments.  Motivated by evidence that 
deferred tax positions arising from revenues and expenses included in GAAP income 
after taxable income are not associated with future tax payments, Laux (2013) suggests 
that the benefit of providing information on deferred tax positions may not exceed the 
cost of supplying and using the information.   
In summary, there is some evidence that deferred tax assets are value relevant.  
However, it is not clear that equity market participants properly price the information 
provided in the deferred tax accounts.  The extant literature suggests that not all deferred 
tax assets are value relevant and therefore may not truly be assets to the firms that report 
them.  It is reasonable to assume that the uncertain nature of the information conveyed by 
deferred tax positions is also problematic for credit market participants, especially the 
agencies that rate the credit risk of a particular debt issuance. 
 In contrast to the literature discussed above, which focuses on equity investors, 
this paper examines the impact of deferred tax assets on credit market participants.  
While analyzing how equity market participants price tax information is important, tax 
information can also affect debt contracts and debt markets.  Given that U.S. corporate 
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debt issuances exceeded $1.325 trillion in 2012 (Thomson Financial 2012), the impact of 
tax information on the pricing of debt could potentially be significant.  
 Recent studies have examined the association between book-tax differences and 
firm credit risk (Crabtree and Maher 2009; Ayers et al. 2010).  These papers are 
motivated by the negative signal that large book-tax differences convey regarding 
earnings quality and persistence (Hanlon 2005).  They find that large book-tax 
differences are associated with higher levels of credit risk.   Wilson (2009, 2010) urges 
caution in interpreting the results presented in Crabtree and Maher (2009) and Ayers et 
al. (2010).  He calls for additional research to determine what is driving the association 
between book-tax differences and credit ratings.  Specifically, he suggests disaggregating 
total book-tax difference into its individual components.  My study attempts to fill a gap 
in the literature identified by Wilson (2009, 2010) by focusing on deferred tax assets, 
which represent a temporary portion of book-tax differences.  I propose that deferred tax 
assets convey information concerning the strength of a firm’s financial position.   
In a study most similar to mine, Gallemore (2011) investigates the credit risk 
associated with the deferred tax asset component of bank regulatory capital.  He 
hypothesizes that banks that have a larger proportion of regulatory capital composed of 
deferred tax assets will be more likely to fail.  He employs a hazard model to test a 
sample of commercial banks and finds that the proportion of regulatory capital composed 
of deferred tax assets is positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the 
recent financial crisis.  Gallemore (2011) attributes his findings to the fact that the 
benefits of deferred tax assets cannot be realized unless banks generate positive taxable 
income. 
	  10	  
Hypothesis development 
The common story in the literature on book-tax differences and credit risk is that 
the primary information conveyed to credit market participants in the accounting 
treatment of book-tax differences is a signal of earnings quality and future profitability.  I 
propose that deferred tax assets convey valuable information about a firm’s balance sheet 
and financial position.  While equity investors hope to realize the benefits associated with 
the upside of profitable firms, creditors, and consequently credit analysts for ratings 
agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, are primarily concerned with the downside risk of 
the firm.  While there is some evidence that deferred tax assets are value relevant for 
equity investors, it is not clear that they provide a substantial buffer against downside risk 
for creditors.  Credit market participants may use and interpret financial information in a 
different manner than their equity market counterparts (Holthausen and Watts 2001).  In 
fact, Pettit et al. (2004) claim that the complexity and uncertainty of the information 
environment leads credit analysts to be extremely conservative in their interpretation of 
financial information.   
Rating agencies do not provide comprehensive disclosure of the process used to 
determine creditworthiness.  However, in an attempt to increase transparency, Standard & 
Poor’s publishes criteria and guidance that governs the analytic basis for assigning credit 
ratings.  One of the key ratios used to determine a firm’s creditworthiness is a basic 
measure of leverage.  Standard & Poor’s criterion specifically states, “the nature and 
valuation of a company's asset mix is critical to determining the appropriate leverage for 
a given level of risk” (Standard & Poor’s 2008).  Their guidance explains that credit 
analysts make “analytical adjustments” to better reflect the reality of a firm’s financial 
	  11	  
performance and position.  Standard & Poor’s states that some of these adjustments are 
routine while others are made on a firm-by-firm basis.  According to their published 
criteria, one potential adjustment to financial statement measures such as total assets and 
stockholder’s equity is “the amount of deferred tax assets unlikely to be realized” 
(Standard & Poor’s 2008).  The level of deferred tax assets relative to total assets could 
clearly impact the denominator of a firm’s leverage ratio. 
The rating criteria developed by Standard & Poor’s also includes an analysis of 
the varying conditions of economic stress that a firm can potentially withstand without 
defaulting on its financial obligations (Standard & Poor’s 2013).  In order to survive 
adverse economic conditions, firms need a level of assets that is sufficient to satisfy their 
liabilities and avoid default.  In assessing the potential for recovery in the event of 
insolvency, credit analysts must assess the quality of the assets available to satisfy the 
claims of creditors.  Deferred tax assets represent future tax deductions.  If firms facing 
conditions of economic stress are unable to generate taxable income, then the benefits of 
deferred tax assets cannot be realized and are therefore of little value to creditors.  
Accordingly, I hypothesize the following: 
 
 Credit risk is increasing in the proportion of total assets that are composed of 
deferred tax assets. 
  
If credit analysts believe that the benefits associated with deferred tax assets are 
likely to be realized, then I would not expect to find an association between deferred tax 
assets and credit risk.   
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Section III:  RESEARCH DESIGN 
To examine the hypothesized association between deferred tax assets and credit 
ratings, I estimate the following ordered logit regression model:6 
 
RATINGit+1 = β0 + β1DTAit + β2SIZEit + β3LOSSit + β4NUMLOSSit + β5EARNit  
+ β6CFOit + β7INT_COVit + β8BTMit + β9LEVit + β10R&Dit  
+ β11CAP_INTit + β12STD_ROAit + β13STD_RETit + β14SUBit  
+ β15AQit + β16PBTDit + β17NBTDit + β18VAit + β19INTANit  
+ β20RATINGit + ΣβFF48Industryjt + ΣβtYearit + εit                            (1) 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
RATINGit+1 Firm i’s Standard & Poor’s domestic long-term issuer credit rating 
(splticrm) in year t + 1.  Standard & Poor’s letter ratings are 
assigned a number from 1 to 22 where AAA=22 (highest rating) 
and D=1 (lowest rating).   
 
DTAit Firm i’s deferred tax assets in year t, scaled by total assets (at) at 
the end of year t.  Deferred tax assets (txndba) are measured net of 
the valuation allowance.   
 
SIZEit The size of firm i in year t.  Size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets (at) at the end of year t.  (I am just curious 
why you used at instead of TA? 
 
LOSSit Equal to 1 if firm i’s basic earnings per share before extraordinary 
items (epspx) is less than zero in year t; zero otherwise. 
 
NUMLOSSit Firm i’s number of continuous prior periods with a reported loss 
(LOSSit = 1). 
 
EARNit Firm i’s earnings before extraordinary items (ib) in year t, scaled 
by total assets (at) at the end of year t - 1. 
 
CFOit Firm i’s operating cash flow (oancf) in year t.  Cash flow from 
operations is scaled by total assets (at) at the end of year t - 1. 
 
INT_COVit Firm i’s times-interest-earned ratio in year t.  INT_COVit is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of (1 + times-interest-earned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The model is estimated with clustered robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial 
dependence (Rogers 1993). 
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ratio).  The times-interest-earned ratio is equal to operating income 
before depreciation and interest expense (oibdp + xint) divided by 
interest expense (xint), all measured at the end of year t. 
 
BTMit Firm i’s book-to-market ratio in year t.  The book-to-market ratio 
is the natural logarithm of firm i’s book value of equity (ceq) 
divided by its market value of equity (csho*prcc_f), both measured 
at the end of year t. 
 
LEVit Firm i’s leverage in year t.  Leverage is equal to long-term debt 
(dltt) scaled by total assets (at) at the end of year t. 
 
R&Dit Firm i’s research and development expense (xrd) in year t, scaled 
by total assets (at) at the end of year t. 
 
CAP_INTit Firm i’s capital intensity in year t.  Capital intensity is equal to 
property, plant, and equipment net of depreciation (ppent) scaled 
by total assets (at) at the end of year t. 
 
STD_ROAit Firm i’s standard deviation of ROA in year t.  Firm i’s standard 
deviation of ROA in year t is calculated using five years of data 
from year t – 4 to year t.  ROA is equal to net income before 
extraordinary items (ib), scaled by total assets (at) at the end of 
year t – 1. 
 
STD_RETit The standard deviation of daily stock returns for firm i in year t. 
 
SUBit An indicator variable for firm-years with subordinated debt.  Equal 
to 1 for firm-years with a positive value for subordinated debt (ds) 
in year t; zero otherwise. 
 
AQit Firm i’s accruals quality in year t.  Accruals quality is estimated 
using the methodology described in Francis et al. (2005).  
Discretionary accruals are calculated based on the model 
developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and amended by 
McNichols (2002).  Discretionary accruals are equal to firm i’s 
residuals from regressing total current accruals on cash flows from 
year t – 1, current cash flows from year t, cash flows from year t + 
1, changes in revenue, and property, plant, and equipment for firm 
i’s Fama and French (1997) industry group.  Accruals quality is 
measured as the standard deviation of discretionary accruals for the 
five-year period from year t – 4 to year t. 
 
BTDit Firm i’s book-tax difference in year t scaled by total assets (at) at 
the end of year t – 1.  The book-tax difference is equal to book 
income minus taxable income.  Book income is pre-tax book 
	  14	  
income (pi) minus minority interest (mii).  Taxable income is 
estimated as the sum of federal tax expense (txfed) and foreign tax 
expense (txfo) divided by the top U.S. statutory tax rate minus the 
change in net operating loss carryforward (tlcf).  If federal or 
foreign tax expense is missing, tax expense is calculated as total 
income tax expense (txt) minus deferred income tax expense (txdi). 
 
PBTDit Decile rank of firm-years when BTDit is greater than or equal to 
zero; zero otherwise.   
 
NBTDit Decile rank of the absolute value of BTDit for firm-years when 
BTDit is less than zero; zero otherwise.   
 
VAit An indicator variable that represents a material increase in the 
deferred tax asset valuation allowance.  The measure, developed 
by Dhaliwal et al. (2013), is equal to 1 for firm-years with 
accounting losses (pi < 0) in year t and zero or positive deferred 
tax expense (txfed >= 0) in year t; zero otherwise. 
 
INTANit Firm i’s intangible assets (intan) in year t scaled by total assets (at) 
at the end of year t. 
 
RATINGit Firm i’s Standard & Poor’s domestic long-term issuer credit rating 
(splticrm) in year t.  Standard & Poor’s letter ratings are assigned a 
number from 1 to 22 where AAA=22 (highest rating) and D=1 
(lowest rating).   
 
Industryjt Equal to 1 if firm i is a member of industry j in year t; zero 
otherwise.  Firms are assigned to industry categories using the 
Fama and French (1997) industry classification. 
 
Yeart   Equal to 1 if observation i is in year t; zero otherwise. 
 
 
 The dependent variable (RATINGit+1) represents firm i’s Standard & Poor’s 
domestic long-term issuer credit rating in year t + 1.  Standard & Poor’s uses a letter 
rating system that ranges from AAA (the highest rating, indicating extremely strong 
capacity to meet financial commitments) to D (the lowest rating, indicating default on 
financial commitments).  In order to estimate the model presented above, I convert the 
letter ratings to a numeric scale ranging from 1 to 22 where D=1 and AAA=22.  
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Consistent with prior literature, ratings are measured at year t + 1 to provide reasonable 
assurance that all of the explanatory variables (measured at time t) are available to credit 
analysts at time t + 1.7  I utilize an ordered logit model because ordinary least squares 
estimation is not appropriate for ordinal dependent variables such as credit ratings.  The 
intervals between the different letter ratings assigned by Standard and Poor’s are not 
likely to be equal.8   
 The primary variable of interest is DTAit, which represents firm i’s deferred tax 
assets in year t, net of the valuation allowance, scaled by total assets.  I hypothesize that 
increasing levels of deferred tax assets will be associated with lower credit ratings.  
Therefore, I expect a negative coefficient on DTAit.  This result would provide evidence 
that the rating agency’s assessment of credit risk is increasing in the proportion of total 
assets that are composed of deferred tax assets.   
 A large number of credit rating studies in the extant literature build upon the work 
of Kaplan and Urwitz (1979).  The authors developed a foundational model for 
understanding the determinants of credit ratings.  They find that credit ratings are 
associated with measures of firm size, leverage, profitability, firm risk, and the 
subordination status of the issue.  To control for size, I include the natural logarithm of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In additional analysis, I use a contemporaneous measure of credit ratings (RATINGit) as the dependent 
variable.  Edwards (2011) finds evidence that credit rating analysts are able to gain access to private 
information through their exclusion from Regulation FD in order to make more timely changes in their 
credit ratings.   
8 In untabulated analysis, I use an ordered logit model to regress changes in credit ratings on changes in 
deferred tax assets and a vector of control variables for my full sample of firms.  Inferences from this 
estimation are consistent with the levels specification.  Because credit ratings are notoriously “sticky” 
(Pettit et al. 2004), a changes specification would potentially provide a more powerful test of my 
hypothesis.  However, while an ordered logit model is appropriate for ordinal dependent variables, such as 
credit ratings, it is not clear that it would be appropriate for a dependent variable that is measured as a 
change in credit rating.  For example, a rating downgrade from A+ to A- would be coded as a (-2) while a 
downgrade from BBB- to BB+ would be coded as a (-1).  However, the downgrade from BBB- to BB+ 
may be more significant because it represents the change from an investment grade rating to a non-
investment grade rating.   
	  16	  
total assets in year t (SIZEit).  I expect to find a positive association between RATINGit+1 
and SIZEit.9  To control for leverage, I include a measure of long-term debt (LEVit).  I 
expect to find a negative coefficient on LEVit.  I control for profitability by including an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has negative book income in the current year 
(LOSSit), and a measure of earnings (EARNit).  I expect to find a negative association 
between RATINGit+1 and LOSSit and a positive association between RATINGit+1 and 
EARNit.  Additionally, to control for firms that have a continuous record of performance, 
I include NUMLOSSit, which counts the number of continuous prior periods with a 
reported loss.  I expect a negative coefficient on NUMLOSSit.  To control for the relation 
between firm risk and credit ratings, I include proxies for operating uncertainty 
STD_ROAit, return volatility STD_RETit, and growth opportunities R&Dit.  I expect a 
negative coefficient on all three of the variables that proxy for firm risk.  I also control for 
firms that carry subordinated debt (SUBit).  I expect a negative association between SUBit 
and RATINGit+1.   
 Francis et al. (2005) find that lower accruals quality is associated with lower 
credit ratings.  To control for accruals quality, I include a measure that captures the 
standard deviation of a firms discretionary accruals (AQit).  Higher levels of AQit are 
associated with lower accruals quality.  Consistent with prior research, I expect to find a 
negative association between AQit and RATINGit+1.  Crabtree and Maher (2009) and 
Ayers et al. (2010) find that book-tax differences are associated with credit ratings.  I 
include measures of both positive (PBTDit) and negative book-tax differences (NBTDit).  
These controls are important because their presence in the model will make it possible to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Inferences from estimating Equation (1) do not change if the log of market value of equity is used as a 
measure of size. 
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determine whether or not the relation between deferred tax assets and credit ratings is 
incremental to the information content of total book-tax differences.  I expect the 
coefficients on PBTDit and NBTDit to be negative.   I also control for capital intensity 
(CAP_INTit).  I expect a positive coefficient on CAP_INTit because firms with greater 
capital intensity potentially present lower risk to creditors (Edwards 2011).  To control 
for firms’ ability to repay debt and general performance, I include cash flow from 
operations (CFOit), interest coverage (INT_COVit), and the book-to-market ratio (BTMit).  
I expect positive coefficients on CFOit and INT_COVit and a negative coefficient on 
BTMit.   
 The variable of interest, DTAit, is measured net of a valuation allowance.  Behn et 
al. (1998) find that the valuation allowance is positively associated with financial distress 
and material contingent liabilities.  Since data on the valuation allowance is not machine 
readable, I use an indicator variable (VAit) developed by Dhaliwal et al. (2013) to 
estimate firm-years with a material increase in the valuation allowance.  Edwards (2011) 
finds evidence that material increases in the valuation allowance represent an implicit 
management forecast of poor future performance.  Therefore I expect a negative 
coefficient on VAit.  
I include INTANit to control for intangible assets.  I predict a negative coefficient 
for INTANit because intangible assets could potentially have no realizable value for 
creditors in the event of default.  Because of the sticky nature of credit ratings, I include a 
control for the rating in year t (RATINGit).  Finally, I include industry (Industryjt) and 
year (Yeart) indicator variables to control for industry-specific and time characteristics. 
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Section IV:  SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
I test my hypothesis by examining a sample of firms covered by Standard & 
Poor’s domestic long-term issuer credit ratings for the years 1993 to 2011.  Data 
collection begins in 1993 to provide reasonable assurance that all firms have adopted 
SFAS 109.  Consistent with prior literature examining the information content of tax 
accounts reported in the financial statements, I exclude firms classified as financial 
institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999), public utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), and firms 
incorporated outside of the United States (Ayers et al. 2010; Crabtree and Maher 2009).  
The basis for excluding these firms is the fact that they face different regulatory, financial 
reporting, and tax issues relative to the remaining population of Compustat firms.  I 
obtain Standard & Poor’s credit rating data from the Compustat Ratings file.  Financial 
accounting data is obtained from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual file.  Returns data 
is collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices. 
Table 1 outlines the details of the sample selection process.  I begin with 36,764 
firm-years for which Compustat reports Standard & Poor’s credit ratings during my 
sample time period.  I exclude 15,618 observations related to financial institutions, 
utilities, and firms incorporated outside the U.S.  I lose 7,517 observations for firms 
missing data on my variable of interest, deferred tax assets.10  I remove an additional 
8,910 firm-years with insufficient information to calculate various control variables.  The 
final sample consists of 4,719 firm-year observations.   
 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Poterba et al. (2011) hand collect tax data for a sample of 81 “super firms” and note that Compustat has 
been slow to encode and backfill data on deferred tax positions from the tax footnote. 
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Section V: RESULTS 
Main results 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for my sample.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  The mean and median level of credit rating 
corresponds to a rating of BBB-.   The sample includes firms with ratings from D through 
AAA.  In untabulated analysis, the data shows that credit ratings remain constant in 
approximately 75 percent of the firm-year observations.  The mean (median) level of 
deferred tax assets is 5.7 percent of total assets (4.8 percent of total assets).   
 Table 3, panel A, presents the results of estimating the ordered logit regression.  I 
observe a negative and significant association between DTA and future credit ratings 
(coefficient = -2.850, p-value < 0.001).  This finding provides support for my hypothesis 
that credit risk is increasing in the proportion of total assets that are composed of deferred 
tax assets.  The evidence is consistent with credit market participants incorporating the 
risk associated with deferred tax assets into their assessment of credit risk and suggests 
that credit analysts do not value deferred tax assets as assets.  The pseudo R2 of the model 
is 61.86% and the majority of the coefficients on the control variables are consistent with 
expectations and prior research.  The exceptions are a positive and significant coefficient 
on NUMLOSS, a positive but insignificant coefficient on R&D, a positive but 
insignificant coefficient on STD_ROA, and a positive and insignificant coefficient on 
SUB. 
 In order to assess the economic significance of the impact of deferred tax assets 
on credit ratings, I examine the difference in predicted probabilities of ratings upgrades 
and downgrades when the level of deferred tax assets moves from the first to the third 
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quartile of DTA, holding all other variables constant at their mean values.  Table 3, panel 
B, demonstrates that moving from the first to the third quartile of DTA decreases the 
average firm’s probability of a credit rating upgrade from 9.2 percent to 7.8 percent, 
which is associated with a 15.6 percent proportional decrease in the probability of an 
upgrade in year t + 1.  Additionally, moving from the first to the third quartile of DTA 
increases the average firm’s probability of a credit rating downgrade from 9.7 percent to 
11.4 percent, which is associated with an 18.0 percent proportional increase in the 
probability of a downgrade in year t + 1.   
 Table 4, panel A presents the results of estimating a variation of the ordered logit 
regression with a contemporaneous measure of the dependent variable (RATINGt).  I find 
a negative and significant association between DTA and contemporaneous credit ratings 
(coefficient = -2.575, p-value = 0.003).  This finding is consistent with my hypothesis 
and provides evidence that credit rating analysts potentially have access to private 
information that enables them to make more timely changes in their ratings.  The pseudo 
R2 of the model is 63.96% and the majority of the coefficients on the control variables are 
consistent with expectations and prior research.  
 Table 4, panel B, presents the difference in predicted probabilities of ratings 
upgrades and downgrades when the level of deferred tax assets moves from the first to 
the third quartile of DTA, holding all other variables constant at their mean values.  For 
the average firm, a move from the first to the third quartile of DTA is associated with a 
15.5 percent proportional decrease in the probability of a credit rating upgrade in year t 
and an 18.0 percent proportional increase in the probability of a downgrade during year t.   
Additional analysis 
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 The consequences of a credit rating change for firms just above or below the 
threshold for investment grade debt may be particularly significant.11  In additional 
analysis, I estimate the following ordered logit changes specification for a subsample of 
429 firm-years with a BBB- rating (RATING = 13): 
ΔRATINGit+1 = β0 + β1ΔDTAit + β2ΔSIZEit + β3LOSSit + β4NUMLOSSit  
+ β5ΔEARNit + β6ΔCFOit + β7ΔINT_COVit + β8ΔBTMit + β9ΔLEVit 
+ β10ΔR&Dit + β11ΔCAP_INTit + β12ΔSTD_ROAit +β13ΔSTD_RETit 
+ β14SUBit + β15ΔAQit + β16ΔPBTDit + β17ΔNBTDit + β18VAit  
+ β19ΔINTANit + ΣβFF48Industryjt + ΣβtYearit + εit                            (2) 
 
 Table 5, panel A, presents the results of estimating the ordered logit changes 
specification.  I observe a negative and significant association between ΔDTA and 
changes in future credit ratings (coefficient = -21.75, p-value = 0.009).  This finding is 
consistent with my hypothesis and provides evidence concerning the impact of deferred 
tax assets on credit risk.  The pseudo R2 of the model is 14.13% and the majority of the 
coefficients on the control variables are consistent with expectations and prior research.  
Table 6, panel A, presents similar results and inferences (ΔDTA coefficient = -32.16, p-
value < 0.001) from regressing contemporary changes in credit ratings (ΔRATINGt) on 
changes in deferred tax assets (ΔDTA). 
In order to assess the economic significance of the impact of changes in deferred 
tax assets on changes in credit ratings, I examine the difference in predicted probabilities 
of ratings upgrades and downgrades when the change in deferred tax assets moves from 
the first to the third quartile of ΔDTA, holding all other variables constant at their mean 
values.  Table 5, panel B, demonstrates that moving from the first to the third quartile of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Credit market participants generally consider ratings of BBB- or higher (RATINGt >=13) to be 
investment grade while ratings of BB+ or lower (RATINGt <=12) are considered to be speculative grade. 
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ΔDTA decreases the average firm’s probability of a credit rating upgrade from 9.1 percent 
to 7.4 percent, which is associated with a 19.4 percent proportional decrease in the 
probability of an upgrade in year t + 1.  Additionally, moving from the first to the third 
quartile of ΔDTA increases the average firm’s probability of a credit rating downgrade 
from 5.8 percent to 7.2 percent, which is associated with a 24.7 percent proportional 
increase in the probability of a downgrade in year t + 1.  Table 6, panel B, shows that, for 
the average firm, a move from the first to the third quartile of ΔDTA is associated with a 
36.3 percent proportional decrease in the probability of a credit rating upgrade in year t 
and a 56.7 percent proportional increase in the probability of a downgrade during year t.   
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Section VI: CONCLUSION 
 This paper examines the relation between deferred tax assets and firm credit risk.  
Deferred tax assets may impact firm creditworthiness for at least two reasons.  First, prior 
literature has documented conflicting evidence on the value relevance of deferred tax 
assets and whether or not these assets are priced by equity investors.  Second, credit 
market participants are particularly concerned with a firm’s downside risk.  Deferred tax 
assets are inherently risky because their benefits are primarily realized through 
deductions from future taxable income.  If a borrower’s financial performance declines, 
deferred tax assets may provide no value to a creditor seeking to recover their investment 
in the event of default.   
 Using an ordered logit model, I regress Standard & Poor’s credit ratings on 
deferred tax assets and a vector of control variables.  I find a significant negative 
association between deferred tax assets and credit ratings.  The evidence is consistent 
with credit market participants incorporating the risk associated with deferred tax assets 
into their assessment of credit risk and suggests that credit analysts do not value deferred 
tax assets as assets.  The model estimates that moving from the first to the third quartile 
of deferred tax assets decreases the probability of a credit rating upgrade by 15.6 percent 
and increases the probability of a rating downgrade by 18.0 percent. 
 Credit ratings serve as a key metric for capital market participants.  This study 
responds to calls for additional research on the extent to which credit market participants 
utilize the tax information disclosed in the financial statements.  I extend the literature 
investigating the impact of book-tax differences on credit risk by contributing to our 
understanding of the balance sheet implications of accounting for income taxes.  
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Additionally, this study contributes to the broad literature of researchers modeling the 
credit rating process by documenting a potentially significant determinant of credit 
ratings.   
 The results of this study are subject to limitations.  All firms in the sample elected 
to have their creditworthiness evaluated by Standard & Poor’s.  This potential sample 
selection issue may limit the generalizability of my results.  Therefore, the associations 
and inferences from my tests may not be applicable to a broader population of Compustat 
firms. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection 
 
Firm-years 
Compustat observations with Standard & Poor's credit ratings 36,764  
Less: financial institutions, utilities, and firms incorporated outside the U.S. (15,618) 
Less: observations with insufficient data to calculate deferred tax assets (7,517) 
Less: observations with insufficient data to calculate control variables (8,910) 
Final sample 4,719  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
RATINGt+1 4,719 12.809 3.523 1 10 13 15 22 
RATINGt 4,719 12.904 3.482 1 10 13 15 22 
DTA 4,719 0.057 0.042 0 0.026 0.048 0.077 0.216 
SIZE 4,719 8.324 1.254 5.796 7.412 8.207 9.115 11.668 
LOSS 4,719 0.172 0.377 0 0 0 0 1 
NUMLOSS 4,719 0.430 1.257 0 0 0 0 13 
EARN 4,719 0.050 0.072 -0.203 0.016 0.049 0.087 0.262 
CFO 4,719 0.114 0.074 -0.047 0.064 0.105 0.156 0.355 
INT_COV 4,719 2.304 0.799 0.824 1.728 2.195 2.724 5.050 
BTM 4,719 0.462 0.494 -1.769 0.248 0.423 0.659 2.314 
LEV 4,719 0.294 0.197 0.001 0.161 0.254 0.379 1.066 
RND 4,719 0.016 0.032 0 0 0 0.017 0.157 
CAP_INT 4,719 0.397 0.267 0.030 0.183 0.340 0.576 1.235 
STD_ROA 4,719 0.045 0.046 0.004 0.016 0.029 0.055 0.271 
STD_RET 4,719 0.026 0.014 0.010 0.017 0.023 0.031 0.085 
SUB 4,719 0.205 0.404 0 0 0 0 1 
AQ 4,719 0.176 0.383 0.009 0.031 0.059 0.134 2.665 
PBTD 4,719 4.021 3.593 0 0 4 7 10 
NBTD 4,719 1.672 2.913 0 0 0 3 10 
VA 4,719 0.081 0.272 0 0 0 0 1 
INTAN 4,719 0.195 0.192 0 0.039 0.138 0.298 0.775 
Notes: This table presents sample descriptive statistics. RATINGt+1 is Standard & Poor’s one-year ahead 
credit rating.  RATINGt is Standard & Poor’s current year credit rating.  DTA is deferred tax assets scaled by 
total assets.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets.  LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if basic 
EPS before extraordinary items is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  NUMLOSS is the number of 
continuous prior periods with a reported loss.  EARN is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
lagged total assets.  CFO is operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets.  INT_COV is the times-
interest-earned ratio.  BTM is the book-to-market ratio.  LEV is equal to long-term debt scaled by total 
assets.  R&D is research and development expense scaled by lagged total assets.  CAP_INT is property, 
plant, and equipment net of depreciation scaled by total assets.  STD_ROA is the standard deviation of ROA 
over the past five years.  STD_RET is the standard deviation of daily stock returns.  SUB is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for firm-years with subordinated debt, and zero otherwise.  AQ is accruals quality, 
measured as the standard deviation of discretionary accruals for the past five years.  PBTD is the decile 
rank of book-tax differences for firm-years with positive book-tax differences, and zero otherwise.  NBTD 
is the decile rank of the absolute value of book-tax differences for firm-years with negative book-tax 
differences, and zero otherwise.  VA is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years with a material 
increase in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance, and zero otherwise.  INTAN is equal to intangible 
assets scaled by total assets. 
 
 
 
	  31	  
TABLE 3 
Regression of future credit ratings on deferred tax assets 
Panel A: Dependent variable RATINGt+1     
  Predicted sign Coefficient P-value 
DTA - -2.850*** 0.000 
SIZE + 0.178*** 0.000 
LOSS - -0.449*** 0.001 
NUMLOSS - 0.0868*** 0.006 
EARN + 3.060*** 0.000 
CFO + 3.027*** 0.000 
INT_COV + 0.074 0.308 
BTM - -0.747*** 0.000 
LEV - -1.721*** 0.000 
R&D - 2.168 0.200 
CAP_INT ? -0.246 0.233 
STD_ROA - 0.532 0.507 
STD_RET - -7.121* 0.088 
SUB - 0.190** 0.012 
AQ - -0.154* 0.069 
PBTD - -0.010 0.333 
NBTD - -0.007 0.656 
VA - -0.155 0.358 
INTAN - -0.158 0.497 
RATING + 2.799*** 0.000 
    INDUSTRY EFFECTS Yes 
YEAR EFFECTS     Yes 
N 
  
4,719 
Psuedo R2     61.86% 
    
    Panel B: Probability of a Credit Rating Change in Year t + 1   
    
Probability of an 
upgrade 
Probability of a 
downgrade 
DTA: 1st quartile 
 
9.2% 9.7% 
DTA: 3rd quartile 
 
7.8% 11.4% 
Change in probability 
 
-1.4% 1.7% 
Proportional change   -15.6% 18.0% 
Notes: Panel A presents results for the estimation of Equation (1). All variables are defined in Table 2.  *, 
** and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively, 
using two-tailed tests.  Panel B presents the changes in predicted probabilities of credit rating upgrades and 
downgrades as a result of moving between the first and third quartiles of deferred tax assets, holding all 
other variables constant at the sample mean.   
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TABLE 4 
Regression of contemporaneous credit ratings on deferred tax assets 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable RATINGt     
  Predicted sign Coefficient P-value 
DTA - -2.575*** 0.003 
SIZE + 0.229*** 0.000 
LOSS - -0.416*** 0.007 
NUMLOSS - 0.028 0.389 
EARN + 6.626*** 0.000 
CFO + -0.051 0.944 
INT_COV + 0.481*** 0.000 
BTM - -0.532*** 0.000 
LEV - -1.764*** 0.000 
R&D - -0.235 0.899 
CAP_INT ? 0.019 0.931 
STD_ROA - 0.218 0.813 
STD_RET - -53.83*** 0.000 
SUB - 0.184** 0.029 
AQ - 0.023 0.800 
PBTD - -0.004 0.736 
NBTD - 0.012 0.481 
VA - -0.141 0.437 
INTAN - -0.155 0.523 
RATINGt-1 + 2.820*** 0.000 
    INDUSTRY EFFECTS Yes 
YEAR EFFECTS     Yes 
N 
  
4,719 
Psuedo R2     63.96% 
    
    Panel B: Probability of a Credit Rating Change in Year t   
    
Probability of an 
upgrade 
Probability of a 
downgrade 
DTA: 1st quartile 
 
7.4% 7.5% 
DTA: 3rd quartile 
 
6.2% 8.9% 
Change in probability 
 
-1.1% 1.4% 
Proportional change   -15.5% 18.0% 
Notes: Panel A presents results for the estimation of Equation (1) modified for a contemporaneous measure 
of the dependent variable. All variables are defined in Table 2.  *, ** and *** next to the coefficient 
estimates indicate a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  Panel B 
presents the changes in predicted probabilities of credit rating upgrades and downgrades as a result of 
moving between the first and third quartiles of deferred tax assets, holding all other variables constant at 
the sample mean.   
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TABLE 5 
Regression of changes in future credit ratings on changes in deferred tax assets 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable ΔRATINGt+1     
  Predicted sign Coefficient P-value 
ΔDTA - -21.75*** 0.009 
ΔSIZE + 2.119* 0.066 
LOSS - 0.103 0.843 
NUMLOSS - -0.314** 0.043 
ΔEARN + 5.433 0.268 
ΔCFO + 1.972 0.327 
ΔINT_COV + 0.457 0.361 
ΔBTM - -1.795** 0.010 
ΔLEV - -4.421*** 0.008 
ΔR&D - -14.790 0.627 
ΔCAP_INT ? 1.539 0.379 
ΔSTD_ROA - 2.969 0.736 
ΔSTD_RET - -0.620 0.977 
SUB - 0.311 0.400 
ΔAQ - -1.378 0.302 
ΔPBTD - -0.029 0.622 
ΔNBTD - 0.001 0.987 
VA - -0.482 0.418 
ΔINTAN - -1.791 0.581 
    INDUSTRY EFFECTS Yes 
YEAR EFFECTS     Yes 
N 
  
429 
Psuedo R2     14.13% 
    
    Panel B: Probability of a Credit Rating Change in Year t + 1 for Firms Rated BBB- 
    
Probability of an 
upgrade 
Probability of a 
downgrade 
ΔDTA: 1st quartile 
 
9.1% 5.8% 
ΔDTA: 3rd quartile 
 
7.4% 7.2% 
Change in probability 
 
-1.8% 1.4% 
Proportional change   -19.4% 24.7% 
Notes: Panel A presents results for the estimation of Equation (2). All variables are defined as listed in 
Table 2 but are modified where appropriate for the changes specification.  *, ** and *** next to the 
coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  
Panel B presents the changes in predicted probabilities of credit rating upgrades and downgrades as a result 
of moving between the first and third quartiles of changes in deferred tax assets, holding all other variables 
constant at the sample mean.   
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TABLE 6 
Regression of changes in contemporaneous credit ratings on changes in deferred tax assets 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable ΔRATINGt     
  Predicted sign Coefficient P-value 
ΔDTA - -32.16*** 0.000 
ΔSIZE + -2.199 0.101 
LOSS - -1.251 0.205 
NUMLOSS - -0.139 0.612 
ΔEARN + -8.387** 0.047 
ΔCFO + -0.882 0.655 
ΔINT_COV + 2.243*** 0.000 
ΔBTM - -1.122* 0.099 
ΔLEV - -2.802 0.138 
ΔR&D - -14.560 0.642 
ΔCAP_INT ? 3.195 0.105 
ΔSTD_ROA - -26.86** 0.018 
ΔSTD_RET - -22.770 0.250 
SUB - 0.445 0.385 
ΔAQ - -1.546 0.224 
ΔPBTD - 0.054 0.362 
ΔNBTD - 0.071 0.237 
VA - 0.219 0.845 
ΔINTAN - -0.586 0.901 
    INDUSTRY EFFECTS Yes 
YEAR EFFECTS     Yes 
N 
  
429 
Psuedo R2     20.82% 
    
    Panel B: Probability of a Credit Rating Change in Year t for Firms Rated BBB-   
    
Probability of an 
upgrade 
Probability of a 
downgrade 
ΔDTA: 1st quartile 
 
5.6% 4.0% 
ΔDTA: 3rd quartile 
 
3.5% 6.2% 
Change in probability 
 
-2.0% 2.3% 
Proportional change   -36.3% 56.7% 
Notes: Panel A presents results for the estimation of Equation (2) modified for a contemporaneous measure 
of the dependent variable. All variables are defined as listed in Table 2 but are modified where appropriate 
for the changes specification.  *, ** and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  Panel B presents the changes in predicted 
probabilities of credit rating upgrades and downgrades as a result of moving between the first and third 
quartiles of changes in deferred tax assets, holding all other variables constant at the sample mean.   
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